SUDDHADVAITA BRAHMAVADA

by

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* Published by : *

SHRI SUBODHINIJI PRAKASHAN SANSTHA

C/o. Varsha V. Kothi

38/5, Bora Bazar Street, Fort, Mumbai - 400 001.

Tel. : 22666382

Reprint :

2004, September

Book Publication Aid - [illegible]/- 100

Postage Extra

Copies - 100

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INDEX

No.	Chapter	Page No.
1	INTRODUCTION	1
2	PRAMANAS	11
3	PRAMEYA - BRAHMAN	24

INTRODUCTION

Before entering on the description and discussion of the system of Vallabhacarya, let us, for a while, turn our attention to the philosophy and religion of the Vedic seers. Through the dim twilight of the bygone ages, we see the ancient sages repeating the holy verse 'We[1] worship the divine, beautiful, nescience destroying Lord Savitr. May He turn our thoughts to Him'. We see Aruni teaching his son the doctrine of 'The[2] knowledge of everything by the knowledge of One'. We see Yajnavalkaya[3] repeating similar holy instruction to his wife Maitreyi. The sages of ancient India believed in an optimistic thorough-going panTheism. The bastard theories like the doctrine of illusive scepticism were entirely unknown to them. But the poisonous current of corruption sapped the solid

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1. tat savitur varenyam bhargo devasya dhimahi dhiyo yo nah pracodayat. (Rk Samhita III. 62. 10; Sama Samhita 14. 62; Yajurveda Samhita III. 35; XXII. 9; XXX. 2; XXXVI. 3).
2. eka-vijnanena sarva-vijnanam.
3. na vatre sarvasya kamaya sarvam priyam bhavati. atmanas tu kamaya sarvaim priyam bhavati. (Brhadaranyaka Upanisat II. 4.3; IV. 5. 6.).

foundations of the old Vedic religion, and in its stead arose numerous other theories, theistic, anti-theistic, orthodox and heretical. These theories do not, in any way, supply the youthful buoyant spirit of the Vedic times. The optimistic spirit was turned into a pessimistic one.

The names of some of these systems are sankhya, yoga, nyaya, vaisesika, and the mimamsa, among the orthodox ones; and Jainism,Buddhism and the Materialism of the Carvakas among the non-orthodox ones. We shall briefly refer to these systems without making any anttempt to criticise them here, as they are already seriously criticise by Badarayana Vyasa. For the sake of convenience, let us take the non-orthodox ones. The naturally devout mind of the Indian cannot for a moment entertain the soul-less materialism of Carvakas. Vyasa takes no notice of it, and even though it may have some secret followers scattered here and there in India, we shall none be the worse if we entirely ignore it.

Among the un-orthodox systems, Vyasa takes particular care to criticise the two most important of them, viz., Buddhism and Jainism. Their propounders did not accept the authority of the vedas. Theirs is the revolt against the old Vedic religion.

The cardinal doctrines of the first are general momentariness of all existing things, general void, and coming into existence of a thing from nothing. The

Bauddhas do not believe in a permanent soul. The purpose of the soul is served by alayavijnana[1]. There is no **Isvara-God. Karma** is the chief regulator.

The Jainas are anekanta-vadins. Their doctrine is styled sapta-bhangi-naya[2], which they apply to all existing things. Like the Bauddhas, they also do not believe in God as a creator. According to them, the human soul consists of atoms, and is of the size of the body.

The spirit of these two systems is pessimistic. Their claims to be ranked as religious systems are based on their laws of rigidly disciplining the life of man. These two systems are vehemently criticised by Vyasa in the second pada of the second chapter of the **brahma-mimamsa**

Of all the systems which recognize the vedas as an authority, the first and foremost stands the atheistic system of Kapila. The importance of this system can be realised from the fact that Vyasa devotes more padas than one for its refutation, and that it has been hailed with great enthusiasm by modern oriental and occidental scholars as 'the first singularly philosophic attempt which tries to probe into the mysterious problems of the universe through the

1. alaya-vijnana comprises a series of cognition which refer to ego.
2. This view considers everything in the following seven ways, viz. somehow it is ; somehow it is not ; somehow it is and is not ; somehow it is indescribable ; somehow it is not and is indescribable ; somehow it is and is not, and is indescribable. syad asti, syan nasti, syad asti ca nasti ca, syad avaktavyah, syad asti cavaktavyah, syan nasti cavaktavyah, syad asti syan nasti ca syad avaktavyas ca.

instrumentality of pure reason'. The Sankhyas admitted two principles, **purusa** and **prakrti**. They did not accept any thing like **God-Isvara.** The **purusa** or souls are many, all pervading, devoid of attributes and action, intelligent etc., while **prakrti** is the equibalance of the three gunas **sattva, rajas and tamas.** When **purusa** becomes conscious of prakrti, the equibalance of these three gunas is disturbed, and creation is the result, which leads **purusa** into bondage. The sole aim of the Sankhyas is to set free **purusa** from **prakrti**. A complete cessation of all pains and soul's existence in an unconscious connection with pure intelligence constitue absolution. The sankhya system is technically called vikrta-parinama-vada. The turning of milk into curds illustrates prakrti's evolution into universe. With the thorough refutation of the **Sankhya** system, Vyasa disposes of the **yoga** system in only one sutra (2.I.3).

Setting aside the Vedic claims of the **Sankhyas**, Vyasa then proceeds to show that the tarkika systems, the **nyaya and vaisesika** both, stand on the same level with them. Their claims to be regarded as Vedic are still poorer. **Nyaya and vaisesika** systems are attributed to Gautama and Kanada respectively. They believe that the universe has originated out of atoms. **Isavra**-God, whom unlike the **Sankhyas** they accept, is only the efficient cause of the universe as a potter is of the jar. The human souls are many, all pervading, etc. Final complete cessation of all of

pains is their ideal of absolution or **moksa.** This doctrine is technically known as **arambha-vada,** or **asat-karya-vada.** Coming into existence of a pot which had no existence in earth before its origination illustrates the case of the universe coming into existence though it was not there in atoms.

With Jaimini, his own pupil, the author of **karma-mimamsa,** Vyasa has not much to quarrel. Vyasa in general accepts the lines of reasoning established by Jaimini in his work. The only thing to which Vyasa strongly objects is the sole predominance of **karma** in the regulation of the universe. Vyasa believes **karma** as one of the inherent eternal powers of God, Who through the agency of **karma** controls the universe.

The system of Vyasa is taught by him in the Brahma-sutras. Vyasa is the highest authority on the vedas. To him is ascribed the division of the **veda**, and the authorship of the eighteen Puranas including the Bhagavata, the Maha-bharata including the Gita, the Vedanta-sutra or Brahma-surtra, and a commentary on the **Patanjala Yoga-sutras.** All Indian authorities recognize in him the incarnation of the knowledge of God. And to benefit the world he has rightly summarised the teachings of the vedas in his **brahmamimamsa,** removing all apparent mutual contradictions in the vedas that may arise through the aberrant genius of several thinkers, demolishing the claims

the Sankhyas and other orthodox systems to be regarded as Vedic, exposing the baselessness of the unorthodox systems like Buddhism and Jainism even from the standpoint of pure reason, and laying down a series of authoritative sutras, which might prove difficult to a future **mayavadin** commentator to reconcile with his theory of **maya,** except through the aid of fallacious reasoning, or blinking ones`s eyes to the significance, of the whole body of the revealed scriptures.

Though we say Buddhism has left the land of its birth, it is not the whole truth, for even at present it is to be found in a disguised form. The theory of **maya** in its proper light is a mild edition of Buddhistic doctrine. Its ultimate significance is very similar to Buddhism. This theory[1] comes very near to the Buddhistic doctrine of void or **sunya-vada**. The whole theory appears to have been propounded in a queer vein of melancholy[1]. Though this system boasts as thoroughly Vedic, the absolute eternal truths of the vedas in their proper light are conspicuous by

1. The universe, the souls and Isvara-acting God are all creatures of nescience. They do not really exist. The supreme brahman which they are pleased to term 'really existing' is devoid of all attributes. It is not intelligent, but intelligence itself. See Sankara-bhasya. 2. 1. 14

1. anandamaye dukkhastitva-kathanaṁ tadgranthakrto mahaduhkha-samskarasya prabalyam eva gamayatiti dik. (Anu-bhasya-prakasa I. 1. 12. B. S. S. pp. 198-199).

their very absence. All[2] seems distorted and twisted. Hence it is that the claim of this theory of **maya** to be regarded as Vedic is vehemently criticised by all the later doctors[3] of **vedanta**. Some[4] Western scholars also admit that **sankara** tenets are nowhere to be found in the Vedanata-sutras. To such a system it is but natural that Vallabhacarya should be strongly opposed.

When Vallabha was born, this anti-theistic[5] system was very prevalent, as it is even to-day through the general ignorance of the people. In spite of Ramanuja, Madhva, and others, Sankara seemed to carry everything before him on account of the unrivalled charm of his language. The whole body of the Vedanta-sutras has been poisoned to the very core by the so-called theory of **maya**. The pure **brahma-vada** of the ancient Vedic sages was covered up by this new doctrine, having its origin in Buddhism. It was Vallabha who tried and succeeded in showing the baselessness of maya-vada in the Vedanta-sutras, and establishing the pure **brahma-vada** of Vedic seers by a thoroughly consistent interpretation of the **brahma-mimamsa**. The Vedic doctrine of Vallabha is known as

2. See Sankara-bhasya on the anandamayadhikarana, the Daharadhikarana, the first pada of the second chapter, the third and the fourth padas of the fourth chapter of the Brahma-mimamsa.
3. Ramanuja, Madhva, Bhaskara, Srikantha, Nimbarka, Bhiksu and Vallabha.
4. See Dr. Thibaut's Introduction to Vedanta-sutras, Vol. I.
5. isvarasya isvaratvam......na paramarthatak etc. See Sankara-bhasya on Brahma-sutra 2.1.14.

suddhadvaita brahma-vada. This doctrine is the natural outcome of the four prasthanas[6]. Vallabha[7] has written on all these with a view to show that they unanimously teach one and the same thing. Similar attempts before and after Vallabha were made by Sankara, Bhaskara, Ramanuja, Madhva, Srikantha and Bhiksu. It will be found by any thoughtful and unbiassed student of comparative philosophy that these systems are not the outcome of a natural and consistent interpretation. With regard to Sankara's system something has been said before, and what remains will be told side by side with the principles of Vallabha's system, in order that the two systems may be distinctly grasped and their arguments weighed.

Ramanuja and Srikantha are both Visistadvaita-vadins[1]. One is a vaisnava, and the other is a saiva. It deserves to be remarked that this saiva system is altogether different from the sankara system. According to Sankara, Brahma, Visnu and Siva are mere creatures of nescience, and are as unreal as the objects seen in a dream. But to Srikantha, Siva is the real supreme deity, as Visnu is to Ramanuja, Madhva or Nimbarka, or Purusottama to Vallabha. Bhaskara and Nimbarka are both

6. Vedas, Gita, Brahma-sutras and Bhagavata.
7. Gayatri-bhasya, Gita-Sastrartha-prakarana, Anu-bhasya and Subodhini.

1. They accept non-duality, but with some reserve, that is qualified non-duality.

dvaita dvaita[2] philosophers. To the fist named scholar duality is due to the real limiting adjunct, while non-duality is real; to the second non-dualistic is **aupadhika**, due to the limiting adjunct, while duality is real. Madhva is a dualistic philosopher, but Vallabha looks upon him also as a partially dualistic and partially non-dualistic one. The theory of Bhiksu is styled as **vibhagadvaita**. This theory is the outcome of the mixture of sankhya, yoga,and the vedanta.

In Purusottamaji`s Prakasa on the Anubhasya all these systems are shown to have done poor justice to the four prasthanas. The comparison of all Bhasyas shows that the interpretation which Vallabhacarya has put on the Vedanta-sutras is the oldest, the truest, and the best, and that the remaining systems, orthodox or opposite, have caught but partial glimpse of the eternal light of truth. The correctness of this remark will, we are sure, be brought home to every unbiassed reader and thinker.

2. Those who partially accept duality and non-duality as well.

CHAPTER 1

PRAMANAS

From the times of Vyasa it has been the practice of Indian wirters on philosophy to divide their writings into four parts, viz, **pramana**, **prameya**, **sadhana** and **phala**. Vallabhacarya also follows the same. The first chapter consists of discussions on pramanas. First the pramanas, their province, their number and meaning are determined and then we come to what is established by these pramanas. This is what is technically termed **prameya**. In the third chapter, viz. **sadhana**, the ways and means to realise or attain the **prameya** **(brahmasvarupa)** are discussed and ascertained. The last or **phala prakarana** describes the fruits which are to be achieved through these sadhanas. This is the general arrangement adopted by Vallabhacaryan writers, and therefore we shall also follow the same lines in the description of the system.

Before the atheistic wave of Buddhism had passed over India, before the Sankhyas had declared the supreme

independence of the human mind, the prevailing authority in India in spiritual matters was **veda** with all its divisions and sub-divisions. The Vedic seers believed **veda** to be their sole guide. But on account of the corruption of the post-vedic times and the materialistic tendencies of the Carvakas, the supreme authority of **veda** on spiritual matters was greatly impaired. Buddha not only questioned the authority of vedas, but rejected it altogether. The Jainas followed the same course. The distinction between earthly **(laukika)** and unearthly **(alukika)** was blurred, and the Carvakas with all their vehemence condemned vedas and asserted the supreme authority of perception alone. The Bauddhas, on the other hand, did not believe in mere materialistic enjoyments, but they accepted two pramanas, viz. perception and inference as means to right knowledge.

Among the orthodox writers, the Sankhyas, the Tarkikas and the Mimamsakas accepted the testimony of vedas, hence they are called Astikas. It should also be noted that not withstanding the unanimous acceptance of the vedic testimony, the value of it did not stand on the same footing with all of these. And as we proceed from the first to the second and from the second to the third, the weight of the vedic testimony gradually increases.

The genuinely philosophical spirit in which the Sankhyas write and their rigid system of rising from the known factors of experience to the unknown by logical

demonstration, thus arriving at a knowledge of final cause, is admired by all the scholars who have seriously occupied themselves with their system. With Sankhyas the knowledge of formal existence is gained by perception, of things beyond senses by inference, and of what cannot be determined by either, by vedic testimony. Like modern sceptics they depended solely on perception and inference, but whenever their perception and inference could be supported by the vedas they corroborated the same by means of the vedas. They thus accept the authority of the vedas, but at the same time they insist that the vedas should always be interpreted in the light of perception. They would even accept **smrti** as authority if it is in harmony with perception. Thus in Kapila`s doctrine for the first time in the history of the world, the complete independence and freedom of the human mind were established, and full confidence in its own powers was boldly asserted.

The Naiyayikas elaborated the science of Indian logic. They introduced a chapter on the discussion of the means of right knowledge **(pramana)** in their works. This method has found great favour with other writers also. The **Naiyayikas** accepted four pramanas viz. perception, inference, analogy and word or vedic testimony **(apta-vakya)**. The vedic testimony does not stand on the same level with perception and inference, but occupies a somewhat subordinate position.

The Mimamsakas accepted six pramanas. They added **arthapatti** and **anupalabdhi** to the four of the Naiyayikas. Sankara also does the same, but with him **these** pramanas are truly speaking **(paramarthatah)** mere figments of nescience. He would tell us that a right goal could be reached even by taking to a wrong Path ! His pramanas are really unreal, but they will lead one to the real realisation of **brahman** in one's self !

Lastly we come to Vyasa. He accepts srutis or revealed scriptures to be the real **pramana**. The words **pratyaksa** and **anumana** are used by Vyasa in his **brahma-mimamsa** to mean **sruti** and **smrti** respectively and not perception and inference. Vallabhacarya does not swerve from the lines that are chalked out by learned Badarayana Vyasa. Like Vyasa he believes word of the revealed texts **(sabda)** to be the only pramana in the consideration of spiritual matters **(alaukika arthas)**. Perception and inference are to be accepted in the light of **sruti** or vedas. The perception or inference of a rajasa or tamasa person whose internal vision has been blinded, cannot be relied upon. Reason when in agreement with the revealed scriptures may be accepted as authoritative **(pramana).**

But a question may be asked, why should reasoning be accepted in the light of the vedas, why should reasoning be bound down by them ? No doubt in matters of ordinary experience, reason is our surest guide. But there is a limit

beyond which reason cannot go. The realisation of the supreme is an experience of the few blessed rsis. We have no experiene of the supreme, and hence our reason based as it is on our experience, cannot be very safe. We are so full of conflicting moods and motives that our reason is very frequently liable to err. Our experience is very limited, our minds are not pure, our hearts are surrounded by local environments, hence based as it is on these, reason is not sufficient enough to grasp the supreme which is unlimited by time, place and circumstance. The ancient sages, on the other hand, were free from our shortcoming. Born of the divine element **(daivi sampatti)** in the land of plenty, the ancient Hindu sages led a pure life and by constant meditation penetrated into the deepest mysteries of Being, and in their inspired moments caught glimpses of Truth. What they saw in their inspiration, what was revealed to them in their holy communion, they collected together. This collection is the Veda. It is knowledge. It is absolute. It is unchanging. It is eternal wisdom. It is **Truth-brahman.** Hence there is nothing wrong, if our reasoning is accepted in the light of the vedas.

Again, the preconceived notions of different persons vary. Even if they accept the same premises, they will inevitably come to different conclusions, because in coming to a conclusion they will import their own experience also- the bias of their own minds.

One man will say that **karma**[1] is supreme, another will say that **daiva**[2] is supreme, the third will say that the surroundings of each man determine the final result, and thus best intellects are bound to differ. It will be seen that a particular man at a particular time is world`s history rules his fellow-creatures so far as reason is concerned, but in the very next age after him, his conclusions may be doubted. Thus Buddha ruled in his age, but now and for a long time past his conclusions have been doubted.

The safest course, therefore, is to accept the views of rsis embodied in our most sacred **vedas**, the **veda** whom we revere, and whose authority we accept as final. Such is the explanation why all orthodox systems unanimously accept the authority of vedas. Of course with those who do not accept the same authority, only reason is the common platform, but it should always be borne in mind that it is not the surest guide.

Vedas were revealed to the ancient sages in their deepest meditation, and the highest truth was experienced therein by them. This truth was the nature **(svarupa)** of the supreme deity. The experience of the sages is ulimited by time, place and circumstance. Hence vedas are said to be not composed by any mortal **(apauruseya)** and regarded as self-evident testimony **(svatah-pramana)**, and eternal.

1. Actions done in previous life.
2. God`s will.

With vedas, their letters, words and sentences, as describing[1] the supreme deity are regarded as eternal. This is the conclusion accepted by Vallabhacarya[2], that is, in consideration of transworld subjects **(alaukika-arthas)** vedas are the highest authority. Reasoning, perception, inference and other smrtis[3] are to be accepted as authoritative in so far as they are in agreement with vedas.

Now a question may arise as to what is signified by this vague term 'vedas'. The word 'vedas' means different things to different writers. Some modern wirters look upon the **samhita** portion to be the real vedas, some consider upanisads to be vedas. To some the **karma-kanda** comprises vedas, others look upon the **jnanna-kanda** as 'vedas'. Some even insert **upasana-kanda** between **karma-kanda** and **jnana-kanda.** One does not quite understand why these writers lay stress on a particular portion of vedas. It has been the practice from the earliest times to call the vedic literature down to upanisads (included) as **sruti** (revealed), and hence one would naturally be inclined to look upon the whole vedic literature

1. varnah padani sarvani Bhagavad-vacakatvatah. sarvarthanye va sarvatra vyavahrtyai tathapi tu. sakti-sankocato loke visesa-khyapakani vai. (T. D. N. II. 153).
2. The view of Badarayana Vyasa is the same, This is clear from sutras, tarkapratisthanad apyanyatha numeyam iti ced evam apyavimoksa-prasangah (B. S. II. 1. 11) and srutestu sabdamulatvat (B. S. II. 1. 27). The view of the sruti itself is the same. Nai sa tarkena matir apaneya (Kathop. I. 2. 9).
3. virodhe tvanapeksam syad asati hyanumanam. (M. S. I. 3. 3.)

comprising samhitas, brahmanas, aranyakas and upanisadas as vedas. Vedas in the opinion of Vallabhacarya include the whole vedic literature consisiting of samhitas, brahmanas, aranyakas and upanisads. The authority of all these stands on the same level. Vallabhacarya does not lay any special stress on **karma-kanda** as the Jaiminiyas do, or on **jnana-kanda** as Sankaras do. With him both carry equal weight. Each is useful in its own way. These two kandas are complementary. The **karma-kanda** describes the supreme as the Lord of Sacrifice **(yajnarupa)**, while the **jnana-kanda** describes the supreme as brahman **(brama-tanu)**. Both[1] together thus describe the supreme as possessed of knowledge **(jnana)** and action **(kriya)**. This is the highest ideal of the supreme that is conceived of in vedas.

The next question is how to correctly understand the meaning of vedas. The holy verse[2] declares that the meaning of vedas is divine **(alaukika)**. Reasoning as such is unable to grasp it, but it can be grasped through penance **(tapas),** Vedic reasoning, or the favour of the supreme deity. With us mental or physical penance is difficult and in the absence of the purity of soul, body and mind, the favour of

1. yajna-rupo harih purva-kande brahmatanuh pare. avatari harih krsnah Sri-Bhagavata iryate. (T. D. N. I. 11).
2. alauko hi vedartho na yuktya pratipadyate. tapasa veda-yuktya tu prasadat paramatmanah. (A. B. I. 1. 1).

the supreme deity is impossible, while Vedic reasoning appeals to most as unsound. Thus the difficulty of understanding vedas correctly is very great indeed, and though the mountain of dificuity is not possible to overcross, passage has been cut from immemorial times to serve the required purpose.

Vedas are accented and they are composed in metres. The correct pronunciation and recitation can be secured only when one has a thorough knowledge of the laws of phonetics and metre. The importance of phonetics can be realised from the fact that a slight change of accent changes the whole meaning of a word. In '**Indrasatru**', 'the slayer of Indra' was turned to 'one of whom the slayer is Indra.' Metres on the other hand keep intact the letter of vedas. These two angas (subordinate lores) together give one the knowledge of the literal text of vedas **(svarupa of vedas)**.

After correctly learning the text (**svarupa**) of vedas, one proceeds to understand the meaning. In the right understanding of the meaning of vedas, two things are required, viz. the knowledge of words and that of grammar. The first is obtained by the aid of **nirukta**, the second by the aid of Panini.

In vedas, there are ritualistic ceremonies. These ceremonies require to be performed at a particular time and place. The method of the rituals must also be known. The

knowledge of the Vedic calendar is given in **jyotih-sastra** and the knowledge of the method is given in the Kalpa-sutras.

Thus Phonetics, Metre, Etymology, Grammar, Vedic calendar and the Kalpa-sutras, these six[1] together, are useful to grasp the literal text, the meaning and the ritual sacrificial ceremonies of vedas, and hence the proper designation of the angas has been given them. It is as such that they stand on the same level with vedas.

With vedas the[2] four supplements to vedas (upavedas) also deserve to be mentioned. These are the science of medicine **(ayur-veda)** of Rg-veda, science of war **(dhanur-veda)** of Yajur-veda, science of music **(gandharva-veda)** of Sama-veda, and science of architecture **(sthapatya)** of Atharva-veda. The first helps to preserve sound health, by which a right performance of rituals **(dharma-siddhi)** is achieved. The second secures one a complete safety in absence of which a right observance of the performance of rituals **(dharma-raksa)** becomes impossible. The third gives the knowledge of the science and art of music by which mental afflication **(udvega)** is removed; and the fourth gives the knowledge of architecture by which the sacrificial altars **(yajna-kundas)**,

1. siksa chandak svarupe tu niruktam vyakrtis tatha. arthe jyotis tatha kalpo hyanusthane prayojakah. (T. D. N. II. 73).
2. arogye dharma-siddhih syad raksa ca dhanuso bhavet. udvegahanir gandharve sthapatyam ca srugadisu. (T. D. N. II. 79).

etc., are exactly built. The close connection existing between the four upavedas is obvious, first health, then protection, then music, and lastly architecture. Such is the utility of the four upavedas. To rightly understand **vedas**, **puranas**, nyaya, **dharma** and **mimamsa** are also necessary. The puranas including Bhagavata, and historical epics, viz, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana.

The **nyaya** means Vedic logic, made use of by learned sages like Sankhyayana in deciding the meaning of the Vedic passages. This **nyaya** may also mean ethics **(niti-sastra)**. This nyaya should by no means be confounded with the **nyaya system** of Gautama. **Smrtis** like that of Manu and the Bhagavadgita comprise the **dharma** group. They all contribute to a correct understanding of the vedas. Last but not the least stand the two mimamsas. They have been written with the express purpose of solving the doubts, that may arise through the defective power of reasoning **(buddhi-dosa)** and difference in individual temperaments **(svabhava-bheda)** of several thinkers. The **purva-mimamsa** of Jaimini solves the doubts of the **karma-kanda**, while in the **uttara-mimamsa** Vyasa does the same with reference to the **jnana-kanda**.

These eighteen[1] lores are necessary for understanding the true meaning and scope of the vedas.

1. Four vedas, four upavedas, six angas and four upangas. For a detailed treatment of this see Purusottamaji on Nibandha II. 97.

This is the view of Vallabhacarya. He further adds that the meaning of the vedas is divine **(alaukika)** and as such it cannot be understood by independent reasoning. It[2] can be understood by religious penance, Vedic logic, and grace of God. The result of this long dissertation is summarised by Vallabhacarya in the opening verses of the first chapter of his Tattva-dipa-nibandha[3]. For the true understanding of divine objects **(alaukika arthas)** Vedas should first be resorted to, but when there arises a doubt in the meaning of the Vedic passages, it should be solved by aid of the Bhagavad-gita, the doubts of Gita by the sutras of Vyasa and those of Vyasa-sutras by Srimad-bhagavata. The consistent and natural meaning which evolves from all these combined is the real **(alaukika)** artha. The works like Yogavasistha, Atma and such other puranas, and a few Upanisads, though attributed to the highest authority, are also to be rejected, because their contents conflict with the established doctrines of the vedas.

Thus it will be seen that Vallabhacarya resorts to the veda and its exegetical smrtis and puranas in the consideration of the **alaukika-artha (brahman)**. But as far as this world is concerned, three more pramanas may be accepted. These are perception, inference and tradition. By

2. See page 12, footnote 2.
3. vedah Srikrsna-vakyani Vyasasutrani caiva hi. samadhi-bhasa Vyasasya pramanam tac catustayam. (T. D. N. I. 7).

perception is meant the perception of a person whose internal vision has been purified through religious practices, which is of course always true. The gist of what Vallabhacarya has said about pramanas is that so far as **alaukika-artha** is concerned the word of the Veda alone is the **pramana**[1] though in **laukika-artha** three more pramanas may be partly useful.

1. Pramana is defined as anadhig atarthagantr by Vallabhacarya. One which reveals what is unknown is pramana.

CHAPTER II

PRAMEYA : BRAHMAN

In the preceding chapter the data on which Vallabhacarya bases his conclusions regarding theology and metaphysics are given. This chapter procceds to give a detailed account of the conclusions arrived at by him on the basis of the same data. This is technically known as **prameya**. The **prameya** comprises of **brahman, jiva, jagat,** etc. ; and as **brahman** is everything **jiva, jagat,** etc., the word **prameya** is very often restricted in its meaning of **brahman** alone. So we now consider **brahman** or the Surpreme as conceived of by Vallabhacarya on the authority of the revealed scriptures. It is very essential to grasp this for round the Supreme as the centre the whole philosophy and theology of vedic scriptures turn.

To a beginner it becomes a great puzzle, as to what **brahman** is, specially when he meets with passages in scriptures apparently contradicting one another, and an

enormous diversity of opinions among the exponents of vedic scriptures. One[1] passage of the upanisads describes **brahman** as devoid of any attributes, while the other[2] as possessed of all attributes. Sankara gives it as his opinion that Supreme brahman is absolutely free from any attributes while Ramanuja goes to the other extreme and declares that the Supreme **brahman** is possessed of all attributes. Even in the times of Badarayana a great conflict of opinions existed among the great doctors of **vedanta**. This fact is testified to form the Vedanata-sutras themselves which are introduced to refute or mention their opinions.

The Supreme[1] is described by different names in different **prasthanas**. It is known as **brahman** in the Upanisads and the Vedanta-sutras, as **paramatman** in the Gita, as **bhagavan** in the Bhagavata. A cursory glance at the Vedanta-sutras will convince the unbiassed reader that Vyasa describes **brahman** as possessed of all attributes and all powers. The idea that **brahman** is absolutely devoid of attributes does not seem to have at all occurred to him when he summarised the teachings of the Upanisads in his

1. asthulam ananvahrasvam adirgham. (Br. Upa. III. 8. 8). etc.
2. yah sarvajnah sarva-saktih.(cp. yah sarvajnah sarvavit. Mund. Upa. II. 2. 7).

1. Vedante ca smrtau brahma-lingam bhagavate tatha. brahmeti paramatmeti bhagavan iti sabdyate. (T. D. N. I. 6).
2. yah sarvajnah sarva-saktih. (cp. Munda. Upa. II. 2. 7). sarvasya vasi sarvasyesanah. (Br. Upa. IV.4.22).

vedanta-mimamsa. The Vedic[2] passages describe brahman as one who is omniscient and omnipotent, the ruler and the controller of all. The powers knowledge, omniscience and activity are all inherent in **brahman**[3]. They are not the figments of nescience. The very name **saccidananda** by which **brahman** is very often spoken of informs us that it is not absolutely devoid of attributes. The supreme **brahman** is all-prevading, unchangeable, almighty, omniscient, absoultely independent and free from the attributes originating from prakrti, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas[4]. The supreme brahman is all-prevading, that is, it is free from the limitations of space, time, and substance **(vastu and svarupa)**. Hence also it is devoid of three distinctions[5] within itself **(viz. sajatiya jiva, vijatiya jagat, and svagata antaryamin). Brahman** inheres in all these **(anysyuta)**. The Supreme **brahman**[6] is possessed of all such attributes like truth, purity, mercy, tolerance, etc. It is the support of all. The **maya** is its real positive power. It is not all in all but one of the many. The supreme brahman is

3. svabhaviki jnana-bala-kriya ca. (Sveta. VI. 8).
4. saccidananda-rupam tu brahma vyapakam avyayam. sarva-sakti svatantram ca sarvajnam guna-varjitam. (T. D. N. I. 65).
5. sajatiya-vijatiya-svagata-dvaita-varjitam. (T. D. N. I. 66).
6. satyadiguna-sahasrair yuktam auipttikaih sada. sarvadharam vasyamayam anandakaram uttamam. prapancika-padarthanam sarvasam tad vilaksanam. (T.D.N. I. 66-67).

1. jagatah samavayi syat tad eva ca nimittakam. kadacid ramate svasmin prapance pi kvacit sukham. (T.D.N. I. 68).

bliss (**anandakara**). It is beyond all wordly things. It[1] is both the material and efficient cause of the universe. When the supreme **brahman** wills to sport outside, it evolves this universe, etc., but when otherwise it involves in. Bhagavata[2] also declares that the supreme Lord is the **prakara** of all **vibhaktis**. The learned Badarayana Vyasa asserts[3] that the same unchangeable supreme **saccidananda-brahman** is both doer and enjoyer. It[4] is the internal self (**antaryamin**). It is **vaisvanara**. It is supported and supporter. It is **bhuman, aksara, prasasaka, setu, vidharana, apahatapapman, dahara, jagat-kampana-kartr, para-jyothih, akasa, avyakta, suksma,** etc. It is through the supreme that the sun shines, the waters flow, the winds blow. All[5] who see, breathe and hear, draw their living from the supreme **nirguna brahman**, not a particle of anything can move without its divine will.

In the supreme **brahman** there is no difference like body and soul as it is with us. It is all-bliss. Just as there is nothing but gold in a gold-ornament, similarly there is nothing but eternal infinite bliss in brahman nirguna. Its[6] and

2. yatra yena yato yasya yasmai yadyad yatha yada. syad idam bhagavan saksat pradhana-purusesvarah. (T.D.N. I. 69).
3. janmadyasya yatah sastrayonitvat. (B.S. I. 12). atto caracara grahanat. (B.S. I. 2.9).
4. See Vyasa-sutras samanvayadhyaya.
5. maya se annam atti yo vipasyati, yah praniti ya im srnotyuktam. (Rk. X. 125. 4).
6. anandamatra-kara-pada-mukhodaradih. (Narada-panca-ratra; T.D.N. I. 44).

hands, feet, eyes, mouth, belly and everything are pure bliss. It[7] stands pervading all. All these attributes are eternal, natural, inherent and non-different from **brahman**. Just as[8] the light of the sun is conceived of as different from the sun, but at the same time it cannot be imagined to exist independently of the sun, similarly the attributes of brahman cannot be spoken of as independent or separate from **brahman**. The attributes are inherent and non-dual in **brahman**. They do not exist independently of **brahman**. Vallabhacarya does not limit the attributes of **brahman**. **Brahman**[1] is possessed of infinite aprakrta[2] gunas and free from any prakrta guna. **Brahman** is all-desire, all-smell, all-form[3].

The view that brahman is possessed of all attributes is not liked by some Indian thinkers, viz. Sankaras. Their argument is that this way of conceiving the svarupa of **brahman** does not give an equally prominent scope to the Vedic passages, which describe brahman as absolutely devoid of any attributes. In support of their view they further add that by the contrivance of accepting higher **brahman**

7. sarvam avritya tisthati (Gita, XIII. 13).
8. prakasarasrayavad va tejastvat. (B.S. III. 2.28).

1. B.S. III. 2.22; Sarvottama-stotra 1.
2. The word prakrta conveys a complex idea. It means born of prakrti, belonging to world, not-divine. aprakrta means opposite of prakrta.
3. sarvakamah sarvagandhah. (Cha. III. 14.2). sarvarupa. Brahman desires all, smells all, assumes all forms.

lower brahman, an equal scope would be given to the conflicting passages of the Upanisads, for affirmative **Srutis** may be accepted as describing lower **saguna brahman**, while negative **Srutis**, **higher brahman**. Thus unlike Ramanuja, their view, if accepted, helps one best to harmonize the apparently contradictory **Srutis**. Dr. Thibaut in his introduction to his translation of Sankara-bhasya seems to be timidly inclined to the same view after advocating the view of Ramanuja in the preceding portion of his introduction.

This view of looking at Upanisads though plausible, does not stand to reason on a critical examination, nay, as will be presently seen, it is liable to very great and weighty objections, some of which are the same which they urge in their own favour. Firstly the distinction between higher and lower **brahman** is never suggested in the Vedanta-sutras. Vyasa is unanimously accepted as the highest authority so far as the consistent interpretation of Upanisads is concerned; and when Vyasa never hints at this distinction, one would naturally hesitate to accept this distinction as one in harmony with the teachings of the Upanisads. Belivers in the eternal wisdom of the Vedas cannot like Dr. Thibaut accept this distinction as a successful weapon of harmonising the conflicting Vedic texts, while admitting at the same time that this mode of interpretation is not countenanced by the Vedic passages taken separately.

Secondly the objection to the distinction of two-fold **brahman** of Sankara becomes more glaring, when one knows that this lower brahman is ultimately unreal. Its omnipotence, omniscience, etc., are all creatures of nescience-thus transforming the **saguna-lower brahman** into a shadow of non-existence. It would therefore show that the so-much-talked-of prominence to all the Vedic texts is illusory. It is only in appearance. Thus it will be seen that the view that Sankara alone can reconcile the mutual contradictions of Vedic passages by introducing a higher **brahman** as referring to Srutis describing brahman as devoid of attributes, and a lower **brahman** referring to Sruti-passages describing **brahman** as omnipotent, omniscient, etc., remains objectionable for the same reason.

Thirdly the propounders confute the very theory by want of consistency. Once they declare that[6] **brahman** supreme, is devoid of all attributes; then again they assert that it is eternal, pure, intelligent and free. It is impossible to conceive **brahman** as absolutely devoid of attributes. Without the divine attributes in brahman one would get not knowledge, but opposite of knowledge.

The question of a faithful and harmonious interpretation of mutually conflicting passages of the Upanisads has been treated by Vyasa. The difficulty of this problem is enhanced by the fact that Vaidikas are always anxious to look on all passages of the Vedas with an equal

reverence. The passage describing **brahman** as **nirakara** carries as much weight as the passage describing **brahman** as **sakara**. Like Sankara they would not like to subordinate one to the other.

The solution of this difficulty as given by Vyasa is worthy of his powerful genius. One is reminded of Vyasa`s great zeal in refuting the **sankhya** doctrine. To completely crush their claims on the Vedas it is not impossible that he might have the idea of still more carrying on with his success. By denying the attributes of **prakrti** of Sankhyas in **brahman**, he gives a rude shock to the Vedic claims of the Sankhyas. This exactly coincides with the view that the negative Srutis deny only the sattva, rajas and tamas, the attributes of **prakrti** in **brahman**, while the positive Srutis describe the aprakrta-unearthly divine attributes of **brahman**. Thus Vyasa evolves a pleasing and harmonious meaning from the mutually conflicting passages of the Upanisads and at the same time gives an equal scope and prominence to all of them without the least violence to them.

Again only what belongs to this world, what is seen in this world can be negated in **brahman**; but what is beyond this world, what is divine cannot be so done in it. Srutis when they describe brahman as **anandamaya**, omniscient or all-doer, speak of the divine **alaukika-aprakrta** attributes of brahman, but when they describe it as one without parts, **niranjana, asthula, neti-neti nirguna,** etc., they do not line

negate the divine attributes spoken of **brahman** before, but only the **prakrta** attributes. This interpretation of the Vedic passages compltely harmonises with the wording of the Vedic verses. In the first part of the verse we meet with a negative conception, while in the second part with the positive. In the first **brahman** is described as one beyond mind and speech; while in the second part the person who has obtained bliss of brahman is past all fear. Hence[1] only the **'prakrta'** attributes are denied in **brahman** by sentences like **'neti-neti'** but not the **divya-divine** attributes like those in sentences, 'He is certainly bliss', etc., spoken of **brahman** before. This way of harmoniously interpreting the Sruti-passages is at a very great advantage as being easy and natural, and obviates the necessity of dreaming of two **brahmans**, viz., **saguna** or **lower** and **nirguna** or higher.

Vyasa, it appears, does not stop here; he is not fully satisfied with this and he boldly goes a step further when he[2] declares that **brahman** is possessed of even contradictory attributes. When **brahman** is possessed of all attributes there is nothing incongruous if it is possessed of contradictory ones.

That this is the view of Vyasa can be seen from the

1. B.S. III. 2.22.
2. B.S. III. 2.27.

of reasoning adopted by him in the following sutras. The view of the opponent who maintains that **brahman** is **avyakta**[1] i.e. one which is beyond conception, which is described only negatively in Srutis and Smrtis, is refuted[2] by Vyasa by saying that when **brahman** is pleased through devotion, it does manifest itself at its own sweet will. Numerous passages[3] from the Upanisads and Gita give testimony to the fact that **brahman** is seen and realised, and hence it is not **avyakta**. In numerous passages of the Upanisads **brahman** is described as possessed of contradictory attributes. It4 is the smallest and biggest. There[5] is none greater than **brahman**, nor his equal, and at the same time it is equal to a gnat and also to an elephant. Sitting it goes to a distance, while lying, its motion covers everything[6]. All this would go to show that **brahman** is possessed of contradictory attributes, if only they are interpreted such as they are without the twisting wand of **maya**. **Brahman** is partless, still it develops this universe etc., from itself without undergoing the least change in itself.

1. B.S. III. 2.23.
2. B.S. III. 2.24.
3. Kathopa. I. 2.22; Munda. III. 2.3; III.1.8; Kothopa. II. 1.1; Gita, XII.54.
4. anoraniyan mahato mahiyan (Kathopa. I. 2.20; Sveta. III. 20; Mahana, VIII. 3. etc.).
5. na tat samascabhyadhikasca sruyate. (Sveta. VI. 8). samo masakena samo nagena. (Br. Upa. I. 3.22).
6. Kathopa. I. 2.21.

It[7] runs without feet, catches without hands, sees without eyes, hears without ears. It is all-pervnding, still it resides in the heart of all individuals. It is merciful and just. **Brahman** is with attributes **(sadharmaka)** and without attributes **(nirdharmaka)**, with form **(sakara)** and without form **(nirakara)**, **nirvisesa** and **savisesa**, firm **(kutastha)** and moving **(cala)**. It is beyond our reasoning. All these attributes are not due to nescience **(mayika)**, but they are real and non-dual from **brahman**. Beyond speech and thought as it is, one attaining its bliss is fearless. The nature[8] **(svarupa)** of **brahman** is so wonderful that even so called contradiction **(virodha)** in it is merit. The[9] whole of this wonderful creation takes place within itself. To **brahman**[1] the creation of this whole universe is a mere sport; so much so that, if any one were to sing this glory of **brahman** he would get **moksa**. Thus **brahman** is one and infinite. One[2] as it is, it manifests itself in infinite forms. Unborn[3] it is born. At the time of incarnation it does not fall from its original state, hence, it is sung as **(acyuta)** infallible. The **wheel** (a symbol of fire) and **conch** (symbol of water), **Garuda** and **serpent** (bearing mutual and natural

7. Sveta. III. 19; VI. 8.
8. virodhas tu brahmano bhusanaya.
9. B.S. II. 1.28.

1. B.S. II. 1.33; A.B. II. 1.33.
2. eko ham bahu syem.
3. ajayamano bahudha vi jayate. (Yajurveda Samhita, XXXI. 19).

animosity) are to be seen in the presence of Vasudeva. This mythology illustrates the Vedic truth that **brahman** is possessed of even contradictory attributes.

No incredible demand is made on the credulity when **brahman** is defined as possessed of contradictory attributes. This has been the belief of the Vedic seers from the times immemorial. Lord Krsna teaches the same thing, when he teaches Arjuna, 'I am[4] the beginning and end of the universe.' Even Sankara is unconsciously teaching the same thing. In his commentary on the Vedanta-sutras (2.1.7) he first writes that partless brahman evolves this universe from within itself without undergoing the least change; but soon after this, his zeal for the theory of nescience baffles him and he hazards to twist the real truth, subjecting himself thereby to a justly severe criticism[5] of Vallabhacarya.

It has been pointed out that **brahman** is possessed of all attributes even those that appear to be contradictory-appear[6] to be because **brahman** being possessed of infinite powers and attributes, the apparent contradiction is no demerit in **brahman** but it suggests the highest glory of the greatest **brahman**.

BRAHMAN IS KARTR : The next question which now

4. Gita, VII. 6.
5. A.B. II. 1.27.
6. A.B. II. 1.27.

confronts us is whether brahman the **nirguna** Supreme is a **kartr** doer or **akartr** non-doer ? The point has been a subject of much discussion.

Except Sankara almost all the Indian theistic philosophers have declared **brahman** to be the sole and only doer and mover. The greatest opposition to this view is to be met in the writings of Sankara and his followers and numerous other scholars oriental and occidental who have been inspired by his writings. The greatest difficutly which perplexed Sankara is that if **brahman-nirguna** were accepted as the sole and only doer, the existence of evil with the perfect knowledge and wisdom of God would become quite inexplicable, and so to avoid this difficulty Sankara advocates the non-existence of any sort of activity in the supreme **nirguna brahman**. But as in that Vedic age Veda was omnipotent, and its sentences directly taught the opposite of it in numerous places, he thought of the ingenious plan of transforming **brahman** into two, one real called **nirguna brahman** and the other its shadow **sabala brahman**. And as the shadow was unreal-non existing, its attributes, activity, etc., were equally illusive and non-existent. As the activity was illusive and non-existent its result (pleasure and pain) was also illusive and non-existent. So teaches Sankara. The source of Sankara was of course the Buddhistic doctrine of void which also aimed at an exactly similar purpose. This is the greatest and most

important objection to the view that **nirguna brahman** alone is independent cause-doer. There are other minor objections of a rather technical order which we shall consider presently. The first and greatest objection resolves itself into so-called fault of partiality and cruelty accruing to **brahman-nirguna** from its being a **kartr;** and it shall be treated as such further on in some details. For the present we shall mention the opinion of Vallabha.

Brahman the **nirguna** supreme is **all-doer-sarva-kartr**. Vallabhacarya does not accept the view of Sankara that **sabala brahman** is all-doer, while **nirguna brahman** is devoid of activity; or that **brahman`s** being a **kartr** is an exoteric teaching, while denial of any activity in **brahman** an esoteric one. It is not through nescience or innate ignorance that the all-embracing activity **sarva-kartrtva**, has been superimposed on the supreme **nirguna brahman**. **Brahman** alone without any sort of nescience-maya is the sole doer. This is what is taught by the Upanisads, Gita and Vyasa. 'The Lord[1] is the creator of the universe and the protector of the universe', and 'Hari-Lord is karta and karayita',[1] sing the glory of the highest **nirguna brahman;** and not that of a **sabala brahman** which only claims to exist through **nescience-maya** or to put it more accurately, which is truly-speaking non-existing. The by

1. **Munda. I. 1.1.**
1. **karta karayita Harih. See also Gita, VII. 6.**

Upanisads[2] further declare that the **kartrtva-action of** brahman is the only real **doing-kartrtva**. The **kartrtva of brahman is divine**-sukrta[3].

This question has much non-plussed Sankara and no-where does he so miss the true aim of the Vedic scriptures as he does in this case. He seems to believe that the arguments for accepting **nirguna brahman** as cause-doer of the universe, are overbalanced by those against it. Some of these arguments against brahman being accepted as a cause-doer are thus expressed.

Firstly, if **brahman** is accepted as the cause-doer, the non-duality **(advaita)** would be sacrificed. Secondly, if self-satisfied **(atma-kama) brahman** is the cause-doer of the universe, it would be liable to the fault of want of **perfection-apurnata**. Thirdly, on the same view **brahman** would be liable to a **change-vikrti dosa**. And as changing things are perishable, **brahman** would cease to be eternal. Lastly, if **brahman** is the sole doer the fault of being unjust to some and partial or cruel to others will accrue to it, and as **brahman** is just same, this injustice, will deprive **brahman** of its essential **characteristic-samata**.

Being guided by these and similar objections Sankara thinks that the best way to avoid these objections is to absolutely deny any activity or action in brahman **(nirguna)**

2. Taitti. II. 7.1.
3. tasmat tat sukrtam ucyate. (Taitti. II. 7.1).

saying that it is falsely superimposed on **brahman (nirguna)** through **maya-nescience** or **avidya** innate ignorance and thus giving scope[4] **also to the passages of** the Upanisads which teach that **brahman** is the sole doer.

As said before these objections are of a rather technical order, and we shall now examine them in some details.

The first objection arises thus. Except Madhva almost all Vedic thinkers lean towards non-duality in some form or other; nay even Madhva in a rare case accepts non-duality which fact inclines Vallabha to look upon him as a dvaitadvaita philosopher. Thus when non-duality-advaita is almost unreservedly accepted as the highest teaching of the Vedas, the diverse complexity resulting from **karta, karma** and **kriya** (action) would become inexplicable. Non-duality unity and complexity-duality being diametrically opposed one or the other must be set aside. And in order to preserve the so-called **advaita-rigid** unity intact Sankara opines that **brahman-Supreme nirguna** is entirely devoid of any energy or activity, and that the Vedic passages describing **brahman as doer-kartr**, describe its shadow.

This objection is based on a mistaken conception of the nature of the supreme **brahman**. In our daily intercourse it becomes our common experience that every

4. Something about this has been said before while criticising Dr. Thibaut,

action presupposes a number more than one, but in case of **brahman** our ordinary experience does not help us much. The very nature of **brahman-nirguna** is such that in the infinite diversity there is perfect non-duality, or to put it the other way, the perfect non-duality does not do away with **brahman`s** power of manifesting itself in myriad forms. At will from being one it can multiply itself into infinite. This is no reproach on **brahman**, but it bespeaks of the eternal glory of the unchanging, divine, eternal supreme. Thus **brahman`s** being the cause-doer of the universe does not sacrifice the pure non-duality, because it is the pure **brahman** which at will develops itself into the infinite diversity through its own ever-multiplying inherent power without undergoing the least change within itself. Bearing this in mind Vyasa most emphatically asserts the perfect non-duality of the cause and effect in B. S. II. 1. 14. The same unchangeable pure **brahman** becomes the cause and effect. This is taught in Vedic passages like 'He made himself'[1] etc. and sutras 'This world has pure **brahman** as its cause for it is a **self-creation-atma-srsti**'[2]. The whole section[3] from B. S. II. 1. 14 to 20, teaches the pure non-duality of the cause and the effect, the part and the whole, sakti and saktiman, dharma and dharmin. There being thus

1. Taitti. II. 7.1.
2. B.S. I. 4.26.
3. tadananyatvadhikaranam. B.S. II. 1. 14-20.

no violence to the 'non-duality' the first objection is to be set aside. The second objection arises thus. It is taught in the Vedas that the pure **brahman-nirguna** is self-satisfied-**(atma-kama)** and also **apta-kama;** and hence one would naturally see no reason why pure **brahman** should work ? Why should it have any sort of activity ? This objection is met by Vyasa in the Vedanta-sutra II. 1.33. **Self-satisfied-apta-kama atma-kama brahman** evolves this universe for its own **sport-lila** and out of its own sweet will. There is absolutely no other motive in **pure brahman**. The Vedic passage 'He[1] does not sport alone. He desired for the second', and the sutra 'The evolution of the universe is a mere sport on the part of brahman (and there is no motive in this sport) as is seen in ordinary life',[2] teach the same thing. The sutra teaches that the self-satisfied pure **brahman** becomes many out of its own sweet will for its own sport. Again, another Vedic passage declares that **brahman** is **purna-perfect** and its effect-this universe is also **purna-perfect**, for **purna** evolves out of the purna which itself exists **purna** even then[3]. A perfect master imparts perfection to all his creatures and it is quite natural that **brahman** should impart its own completeness to

1. sa vai naiva reme tasmad ekaki na ramate. sa dvitiyam aicchat, sa haitavan asa. (Br. Upa. I. 4.3).
2. lokovat tu lilakaivalyam. (B.S. II. 1.33). In this sutra Sankara adds his mayavada but it clearly goes against the wording of the sutra.
3. Purnamadah Purnam idam Purnat Purnam udacyate. Purnasya Purnam adaya Purnam evavasisyate. (Santipatha).

universe-its creature. Moreover, **brahman** has no desires to fulfil, **brahman** does not evolve this universe to satisfy its desires. It is a sport merely. Like a perfect being it depends on itself. Hence **apurnata**-want of perfection does not accrue to pure **brahman**.

Thus this objection does not come against the view that pure **brahman** is the sole and independent **kartr-doer**. It only tells us that **brahman** is not an imperfect being like us, nor has it any of our earthly desires to accomplish. Its activity is for eternal divine sport, but active it is, it is not devoid of any action or energy, though to be active or does not depend solely upon its own sweet free will.

Like the preceding one this objection is also raised by a **Sankhya**. It is put forth in the form of a dilemma. There are Vedic passages which teach that **brahman** is without **parts-niravayava** etc., while there are other which declare that **brahman** is the cause-doer of the universe. On this fact the objection is raised that either **brahman** must evolve wholly in which case its original nature would be destroyed or that it must evolve partly, in which case the Vedic passages declaring **brahman** to be partless would be violated[1]. As a thoroughly Vedic Vyasa has given the

1. B.S. II. 1.26.

solution of this problem in[2] the Vedanta-sutra II. 1.27. Both the facts are taught by Vedic passages, hence the pure Vaidaka follows them to the letter. It is impossible that he should question the truth of the words of the Vedas. Contradictory as some passages may appear, he cannot subordinate one to the other. So to him **brahman** is both **impartite-niravayava** and at the same time the cause-doer of the universe. The word of the Vedas is beyond dispute; and brahman is understood to be such as is revealed from those words. To the Vedic the svarupa of **brahman** is such that it evolves the univrese and yet remains quite unchanged. Gold does not cease to be gold even when it is turned into numerous ornaments. This question is also incidentally touched by Vyasa in[3] Vedanta-sutra I. 1.12. Brahman is the cause of the universe, but as it is **pracurya** it does not undergo any change. The causality and at the same time inchangeability of **brahman** can be learnt from a

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2. srutes tu sabdamulatvat. (B.S. II. 1.27). It is interesting to read Sarikara's bhasya on this sutra. In his usually pointed and lucid style he first comes to the above-mentioned conclusion; but then soon discovers his mistake, for such a conclusion gave a rude shock to his theory of nescience but he would not allow that, and in order to save one he sacrifices the fidelity of a true commentator and proceeds, unlike a true Vaidika, to twist the interpretation of the sutra, forgetting what he said then directly contradicted what he has just said before.
3. vikara-sabdan neti cen na, pracuryat. (B. S. I. 1.12). Max Muller here charges Vallabhacharya with having done violence to the text of the sutra in his Anu-bhasya. But it appears that Max Muller never took pains

host of Vedic passages[1], Smrtis[2] and Puranas[3]. Thus there is no fault of **vikrti-change** accruing to **brahman** though it is the cause-doer of the universe.

The fourth objection will presently be dealt with, and shown to be untenable.

'The ruler and controller of all'[4], 'That by whose order the heaven and earth stand supported'[5], 'The creator created the sun and the moon as before'[6], 'I am the beginning and end of the universe' and numerous Vedic and other passages teach the **sarvakartrtva** of **brahman**. The Vedic passage, 'He sees without ears, runs without feet, catches without hands' teaches that **brahman** is not a doer

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to read Anu-bhasya on that sutra, much less to undrestand it. Had he done that, we are sure he would not have passed such an ignorant remark. The word pracuryat is interpreted by Vallabhacarya in the fifth case also, hence there is no violence to the sutra-text. But one is surprised how that Professor did manage to forget Sankara Bhasya on B.S. I. 1.384 (?) where actual violence is done to the sutras. Max Muller's source of information was that late Mr. Kunte who himself was equally ignorant of the writings of Vallabha. This reminds one of a Vedic passage 'andhenaiva niyamana yathandhah.' Max Muller did not care even to verify whether Mr. Kunte was right. It is an irony of fate that so many scholars including Dr. Bhandarkar have described Vallabhacarya according to their whims, and without taking the least possible trouble whether their assertion can at all be justified. At the end of this book I shall mention this in some details.

1. yato va imani bhutani jayante. (Taitti. III. 1.1). tajjalaniti. (Cha. III. 14.1).
2. Gita, VII. 6.
3. Bha. I. 1.1.
4. sarvasya vasi sarvasyesanah. (Br. Upa. IV. 4.22).
5. Br. Upa. III. 8.9.
6. suryacandramasau dhata yathapurvam akalpayat.

like the individual soul. The powers and resources of brahman are unlimited and infinite. So in the Vedic passages where **brahman** is described as a non-doer, the denial of activity refers not to the assertion of activity in **brahman** spoken of before but only to **prakrta** one. The **svarupa** of **brahman** is such that it acts naturally and at the same time it is free from the faults if there be any arising out of its **kartrtva**. The activity of **brahman** is quite distinct from the activity of **prakrti**, **brahman** has no gunabhimana of what it does[1] and hence no fault accrues to **brahman** even through it is **kartr**..

Up to this time we followed the**'vidhi'** affirmative method by giving reasons and setting aside objections why **brahman** should be accepted as a doer; but now we follow the **'nisedha'** negative method to show that none but **brahman nirguna** alone can be an independent **kartr-doer**.

If pure **brahman** is not accepted as **kartr-doer** it would be impossible to answer the question who else can be **kartr** ? For there must be some creator of the creation-universe. If **brahman** with **maya** is accepted as **kartr** the acceptance of **maya** beginningless sacrifies the **advaita**-the rigid unity; or if **maya** is not accepted in the beginning there would be no creation as **brahman** is **akartr** according to Sankara. Moreover, the **kartrtva** accepted in the first alternative is unreal which fact goes against the view of the

1. T.D.N. I. 69.

Vedic passages declaring **brahman** to be the sole doer. 'The creator of universe and protector of it'[2] and **'karta, karayita** is Hari'[3] do not speak of the attributes of lower **brahman-exoteric** one in the words of Deussxon. Such a belief is at best problematic, and no further consideration is to be negated by the fact that such a belief does not solve the question but only shirks it.

Again, the conception of **maya** according to Sankara is also objectionable. It is not the meaning given to it by Yaska. A belief in a beginningless **sadasat maya** has no illustration to support itself and hence it is a mere creature of the author's imagination. The non-existence before **creation-pragabhava** of the Naiyayikas cannot be cited to support it, because the **pragabhava** is a mere **non-entity-abhava,** while **maya** is not so. Besides the sadasat meaning of the word **maya** is itself very objectionable. **Sad and asad** both being contradictory cannot exist in one[1] **maya** at the same time. Vyasa never suggests causality of such a **maya. Maya** if at all it means anything means some sort of power the **bhavana-samarthya** as Vallabha would call it. This power is real and not illusive and so **kartrtva** caused through such a **maya** would be real and not illusive

2. visvasya karta bhuvanasya gopta. (Munda. I. 1.1).
3. karta karayita Harih.

1. naikasminnasambhavat. (B.S. II. 2.33).

and so **kartrtva caused** through **such a maya** would be real and non illusive. It would not **destroy** the glory of highest **brahman** accruing to it from **its divine kartrtva**.

True to the principle that the **karta** must always be perfectly Independent, Vyasa **declares** that pure **brahman is** the cause-doer of the generation, **existence** and **absorption** of the whole universe, and not **maya-environed Isvara**. It **must be** thoroughly **borne** in mind that the **karta must be** always independent, and as may-environed **brahman is saguna**, subject to **maya**, it can **never** be a doer. The real **karta** is the same pure **nirguna brahman** defined by Vyasa in the second **sutra**[2] of his immortal work.

It is a point to be marked **that** instead of defining **brahman** as 'Truth, Knowledge and Bliss', Vyasa defines it as one from which the origination, **existence** and dissolution of the **universe take place**. It cannot be supposed that just after undertaking the solemn inquiry of **brahman** in the first **sutra** Vyasa should not in the very next **sutra** define the pure **brahman** whose inquiry he undertakes but the saria of Ramanuja or an **exoteric sabala brahman** of Sankara which after all is a creature of illusion, and a knowledge of which is also another illusion. Thus neither sabala brahman of Sankara, nor **cidacid-visista sarira** of Ramanuja is **kartr** according to Vyasa. According to him only pure brahman alone is kartr.

2. janmadyasya yatah sasirayonitvat. (B.S.I. 1.2).

Neither can **jiva**-human soul be an idependent **kartr**. He is dependent because his **bliss**[3]-portion has been latent, and with the non-manifestation of bliss-portion, his divine nature (power, glory etc.) as an **amsa** of the supreme, has also been non-manifest. Hence **jiva**-human soul becomes bound by avidya (power of god)[1], and thus being dependent, he ceases to be an independent **kartr**. The human soul inherits his working capacity from the supreme brahman[2], but that does not deprive **brahman** of its **kartrtva**.

Nor can **jada-non-intelligent prakrti**[3] of the **Sankhyas** or **maya** of Sankara be the cause-doer independent **kartr**. They are devoid of intelligence **(caitanya)**; and **kartrtva** is possible in only intelligent **(cetana)** beings; hence an independent activity is impossible in a non-intelligent **(jada) prakrti** and its proto-type **sadasad jada** maya.

We thus see that neither **maya** nor **jiva** nor **prakrti** nor **sabala brahman** nor **cidacid-visista sarira** of Ramanjua can be an independent **kartr**. Hence our conclusion is that pure brahman alone is the independent **kartr**. It alone is the material and efficient cause of the whole universe.

3. parabhidyanat tirohitam, tato hyasya bandha-viparyayau. (B.S. III. 2.5).

1. vidyavidye Hareh sakti mayayaiv vinirmite. (T.D.N. I. 31).
2. Parat tu tacchruteh. (B.S. I. 1.4).
3. iksater nasabdam. (B.S. I. 1.4). kamacca nanumanapeksa. (B.S. I. 1.17).

In the Brahma-sutras Vyasa undertakes an inquiry into pure **brahman** in the first sutra[4]. In the second sutra[5] he defines **brahman** as the independent cause-doer of the universe. The **svarupa** of **brahman** is to be learnt from the Vedas alone. In the third sutra[6] **brahman** is declared to be the material cause of the universe, thus teaching that the **sadrupa brahman** is the cause-doer. From the fourth **up to** tenth sutra **cidrupa brahman** is taught to be the **cause-**doer. The fourth sutra[7] declares that **brahman is not asabda**, it can be revealed through the Vedas alone **on** account of **'iksati.'**[8] The fifth sutra[9] teaches that brahman the independent **kartr** is not **gauna brahman** because the word **atman** denotes[10]

4. athato brahmajijnasa. (B.S. I. 1.1).
5. janmadyasya yatah sastrayonitvat. (B.S. I. 1.2).
6. tat tu samanvayat. (B.S. I. 1.3).
7. iksater nasabdam. (B.S. I. 1.4).
8. Will, thought etc.
9. gaunascennatmasabdat. (B.S. I. 1.5).
10. atmasabdo mukhyataya Parabrahmavaci.

only **nirguna brahman**. The sixth sutra[1] gives a further reason declaring that one **who** has **nistha**[2] in this **brahman** gets **moksa**. This independent attributeless doer is not **saguna** (subject to **sattva, rajas and tamas)**, for only a gunabhimant[3] can be **saguna**, but **brahman** is beyond **sattva, rajas and tamas; Visnu, Brahma and Shiva,** respectively; hence it cannot be **gunabhimani** as these deities are. Again, the kartrtva[4] of brahman is not saguna for primary independent action is nowhere denied in brahman in the Vedic texts. The sutras[5] 8th to 10th give further reasons to support the same view. From the 11th sutra[6], Vyasa teaches that **ananda-rupa brahman**. Hence according to Vyasa pure **nirguna brahman** alone is the independent material and efficient cause of the universe.

On the authority of the Vedic passages, Gita, Vyasa and Bhagavata it has been shown before that pure **brahman** is the only independent **kartr**. But in spite of the clear wording of the Vedic texts one is surprised why some writers giving prominence to some negaitve **Srutis** want to say that all these passages refer to a lower **brahman**. How

1. tannisthasaya moksapadesat. (B.S. I. 1.6).
2. faith, sole dependence on the will of **brahman**.
3. Gunabhimana may be explained as consciousness of Prakrti and its attributes viz., sattva, rajas and tamas, and hence subordination to it and its attributes. 4. heyatvavacanacca. (B.S. I. 1.7).
5. svapyayat (B.S. I. 1.8); gatisamanya (B.S. I. 1.9) and srutatvacca (B.S. I. 1.10).
6. anandamayadhikaranam. (B. S. I. 1. 11-18).

does the idea of **kartrtva** lower **brahman** ? **Kartrtva** is as real an attribute of brahman as truth (satya) is, and like satya it is also revealed from the Vedas. Obviously there is no valid reason for the denying of activity in **brahman**. On the contrary the denial of any activity in **brahman** not only degenerates the ancient conception of **brahman** as possessed of knowledge and action, the one aspect revealed from Vyasa-sutras, while the other from Jaimini-sutras, but it completely results in a sort of queer atheism by refusing to acknowledge and sing the highest glory of the eternal divine maker.

BRAHMAN IS BHOKTR : As the Supreme **nirguna brahman** is the **nirankusa kartr-doer** so he is **bhoktr**-enjoyer also. This is a corollary deduced from what has been said before. When it is said that brahman is **bhoktr**, it should not be supposed that it is **bhoktr** in the ordinary sense as we understand. Like its **kartrtva** its **bhoktrtva** is divine. **Brahman** is not a **bhoktr** as the human soul is, but there is something more in it. In the Katha-valli brahma and ksatra and mrtyu are described to be the food of **brahman** the Supreme, and on the basis of this text Vyasa frames a sutra[1] in which he describes **brahman** to be eater-atta of brahma, ksatra and mrtyu. In the just preceding section[2] it is taught that the Supreme Lord resides in the heart of

1. B.S. I. 2.9.
2. sabda-visesadhikaranam. (B.S. I. 2.5-8).

purusa-man; and on this ground a doubt is raised whether brahman like **jiva-human** soul would become subject to enjoyment of happiness and suffering of misery. This doubt is solved by Vyasa by saying that **brahman is visesa. It**[3] is greater than the human soul and as such it is free from the shortcomings of the human soul. So in this section[4] Vyasa boldly delares that **brahman** is **atta** and though to a **jnanin** it appears to be the **atta** of **cara** and **acara (death and brahma & ksatra)**, to the devotee from being 'it' it becomes, 'he' and then the **atta-enjoyer**, of all beautiful things which the devotee is pleased to offer to him through the purest love. This act of enjoyment on the part of the supreme deity is divine, and thus the **brahmatva** of **brahman** remains as it is.

BRAHMAN IS FREE FROM FAULTS : Now we have to consider the first and the foremost objection to the view that **brahman** is **kartr**. The existence of evil with the perfect knowledge, goodness, wisdom and power of the supreme **nirguna brahman** becomes inexplicable, if this view is accepted. The same objection appealed to Vyasa, Vallabha, and his son Vitthala in a different form. The objection with them assumes the form that if **nirguna brahman** is the sole independent doer, it would be liable to the faults of being partial to those who live a happy life and cruel to

3. A.B. I. 2.8.
4. A.B. I. 2.9; See also A.B. II. 3.41; Gita IX. 24.

others who are miserable. Such a fault would appear to be a serious objection to **brahman`s** being recognized the highest, and but for which the conception of **brahman** as the most powerful active agent **nirankusa-kartr** would degenerate into the atheistic view of the instrumentality of the karma of the Mimamsakas or the similar Buddhistic view of the non-existence of any sort of pleasure or pain. Hence to avoid this objection Vyasa, Vallabha and Vitthala approach this question from different standpoints and all try to show that the independent **kartr-nirankusa kartr** is without any **such** faults.

The occasion to answer this objection which Vyasa gets is to remove an objection raised by a Sankhya in B. S. 2.1.34. This is the first time when Vyasa has to pronounce his own opinion on the point. So without entering into details to explain away the objection of the opponent, or to let him feel the nature of the Glorious **brahman**, Vyasa answers it by saying that the Supreme **brahman** is not responsible for the phenomena of happiness and misery that are to be seen in the world, because the **Supreme brahman** allots fruits to the human souls according to their individual actions. To illustrate it, Vallabhacarya says that the Great Creator is the cause, just as rain is to the cultivation of crops; while **karma or** individual action is the real and again

essential cause as seed is to it[1]. A Vedic passage also teaches the same thing. 'The[2] Lord makes him do good actions whom he wishes to raise high and bad ones whom he desires to lower down.' He[3] becomes holy by holy actions and sinful by sinful ones'. Thus Vyasa likes to suggest that **brahman** is not liable to the faults of cruelty or partiality. When thus the difficulty is clearly solved by the words of the Vedic texts, one is surprised why Vyasa should have taken the trouble of introducing this sutra. Again this is not his final judgment for he refers to the same question further on in two places where he clearly seems to advocate the supreme despotism of the will of **brahman nirguna**. But it appears that the **Sutrakara** has some resonable grounds to introduce this **sutra**. Firstly, he wants to convince his opponent that his **brahman** is neither cruel nor unjust, nor dependent on the **karma**, though assigning rewards and punishments according to it. Though giving fruits according to **karma** it is to the supreme glory of the highest **brahman** that it is free from any such ties. And even though this **sutra** has been introduced by Vyasa to explain away the objection of the opponent, one cannot fail to perceive the true insight of the learned author to again and

1. jivanam karmanurodhena sukha-duhkhe Prayacchati... vrstivad bhagavan, bijavat karma. (A.B. II. 1.34).
2. esa hyeva sadhu karma karayati tam yam ebhyo lokebhya unninisati, esa u evasadhu karma karayati tam yam adho ninisati (Kau. Upa. III. 8).
3. Punyo vai Punyena karmana bhavati, papah papena. (Br. Upa. III. 2.13).

emphasise the fact that there is nothing incongruous in **brahman**, or if it appears, it speaks of the glory of the highest **brahman**. To this very conclusion he refers further on as we shall presently see.

The next occasion on which Vyasa touches this very question is in the third pada of the second chapter of his **Brahma-mimamsa**. While describing the human soul, he attributes the individual activity of the human soul to **brahman** soul, he attributes the individual activity of the human to **brahman** the supreme; the primary source of the activity too is **brahman** and not **jiva;** and thus when the activity of the human soul depends on the Supreme **nirguna brahman**, it would be more in consonance with reason to believe that it is the supreme Lord rather than human soul-that is the cause of all activity-and hence of pleasure and pain. Thus Vyasa is again confronted by the same difficulty, as here he mentions individual effort of the human soul as the reason for the unequal distribution of happiness and misery. His judgment here is not at a great variance from what he has pronounced before, but the perusal of it in some details, will surely repay the trouble.

The Supreme[1] Lord pays regards to the efforts made by a human soul while making him work in order to avoid the worthlessness of things enjoined and prohibited by

1. B.S. II. 3.42. See also A.B. II. 3.42.

Himself in the Veda. To explain this in the words of Vallabhacarya, just as a father describing the merits and demerits of a thing to his child, makes him do that for which the boy tries, so the Supreme Lord acts in the case of the individual soul, and as the child is the agent of his efforts and not the father, so the human soul is the agent of his efforts and inclinations and not **brahman**. This is, because **brahman** desires that his injunctions and prohibitions declared by Him in the Vedas should not become purportless. While reward and punishment are decreed to the human soul by the Supreme Lord **brahman nirguna**, it takes into consideration the individual's action, which depends on his effort, which in its turn depends on his desires and which again in its turn depends on **pravaha**-the beginningless cycle of the universe. To preserve the order the Supreme **brahman** gave Vedas to man. Thus **brahman** is not to be blamed for the variety of happiness and misery that are to be witnessed in the world.

In both cases, however, Vyasa's solution of the problem ends in this that **brahman nirguna** allots reward and punishment to human souls in accordance with the **karma** of individuals. But the most emphatic assertion of Vyasa is to be met in B.S. 3.2.38, where he holds in direct opposition to Jaimini, that the Supreme **brahman nirguna** alone is the phaladata-giver of fruits-neither **karma** nor anything else. In order to possess any capacity for yielding

fruits, **karma** must first gain the sanction of the Will of the Supreme Lord. Thus it appears that Vyasa practically favours the perfect despotism of the Supreme Lord in the Divine government. The theory of **karma** is a mere cloak to explain away the simple Sankhya; and thus there arises another phase of the same question.

When the Supreme Lord allots fruits-rewards and punishments according to **karma, the** question then arises what is **karma** ? Has it any independent existence ? If karma is an inherent power of brahman, it is **brahman** which ultimately is responsible. If **karma** be conceived to have an independence of its own in that case, the supreme Lord`s omnipotence would become subordinated to **karma** in proportion to the regard the supreme Lord pays to it in decreeing rewards and punishments to human souls, and thus **brahman nirguna** would cease to be **Isvara**-the greater ruler, in the true sense of the word. Moreover, it is difficult to attribute any independent power to **karma**, because it is non-intelligent, and so an independent action is impossible in it. In order to avoid these objections Vallabhacharya looks upon the same question from another standpoint and offers another solution of the same on the authority of the Vedic texts and Vyasa. That Vyasa`s was a side remark of the problem in B. S. 2. 1.34[1] and

1. vaisamya-nairghrnye na, sapeksatvat, tatha hi darsayati (B.S. II. 1.34).

B. S. 2.3.42[2] is seen from the fact that in the third chapter he distinctly declares that **brahman nirguna** alone is the giver of fruits, and those desiring any enjoyments earthly or unearthly should worship Him and Him alone, except the supreme Lord none has the power to bestow fruits-blessings or curses upon an individual human soul. Again it appears that the solution afforded by Vyasa in 2. 1. 34 was not quite final because otherwise there is no reason why he should have refuted the same view held by Tarkikas even though it be independent of the Vedas. Moreover in 2. 1. 14, Vyasa himself has taught the non-duality-ekatmakata of **brahman nirguna** and his creatures, and as one cannot be unjust or cruel to oneself it is inconceivable how such a question should at all arise from Vyasa`s own standpoint ? But as it is, the question is raised by the Sankhya and Vyasa gives him an answer in opponent`s own fashion falling upon divine will as the ultimate refuge. Hence Vallabhacarya`s descendant Vallabhaji says a mother is neither cruel nor unjust in punishing or fondling her children[3]. So God is not liable to the same faults.

The Vedic text 'He made Himself' and the sutras **'on account of atma-krti-self-making'**, and 'the whole creation has its origination, existence and dissolution in the

2. krta-Prayatnapeksastu vihita-pratisiddhavaiyarthyadibhyah. (B.S. II. 3.42).
3. lalane tadane matur doso na vidyate tatha Isvarasyapi vaisamya-nairghrnye na vidyate.

Lord-atman as His powers are various and wonderful', lend support to the view of Vallabhacarya that **karma** and **kartr** is Lord Himself. In order to evince its greatness the supreme **nirguna** became manifest as numerous human souls, numerous sadhanas and variety of fruits. In order to show Himself **karma sapeksa**, He breathed out the Veda which might serve as a perceptible code of laws as revealing the divine will to human beings. The fruits depend on **karma, karma** on **prayatna, prayatna** on **kamana** and **kamana** on **pravaha**. The **nirapeksa** Supreme **brahman** takes into consideration all these. To preserve order He gives fruits in accordance with **karma**, but He is not bound by it. Like a king the supreme Lord often raises the object of his favour singular to the highest state without the least performance of **karma**. These are however rare cases. The maids of Gokula illustrate the point. Really speaking this **srsti** is a self-creation[1]-**atma-srsti**. The supreme is the subject and the object; and as one does neither become cruel nor unjust to oneself, **brahman** is neither unjust nor cruel. Injustice and cruelty only appear to our limited vision of mind. **Brahman** as a matter of fact is both merciful and just. This is a conclusion, as said before, suggested from what Vyasa taught before. In B.S. 2. 1. 14, he taught that the cause and the effect, the part and the whole were one; so

1. atma-srster na vaisamyam nairghrnyam capi vidyate. (T.D.N. I. 76). See also Prakasa on T.D.N. I. 76.

this creation, this soul **(jiva)** was non-different-**ekatmaka** from **brahman**, hence the question was solved then. The question of injustice, cruelty or partiality arises where there is duality and there being no such thing here, the question does not arise at all.

Gosvami Vithalanatha Diksita son of Vallabhacarya elucidates the point in question so clearly as to leave no room for any doubt. He looks upon the whole universe to be a mere sport-lila of the brahman nirguna. From[2] the moment the Supreme **nirguna brahman** desired to be many, He made efforts to have His sport. Everything was subordinated to this sport-**lila**. He therefore fixed, 'from the beginning to the time when one attains **moksa**-empancipation-this will be done by this human soul and this fruit He shall give to this jiva-human soul.' Hence the supreme Lord is termed the vakta dictator, **karta**-author and **abhiraksita**-protector of law. Everything is done by the Divine Will for the eternal sport. The Vedic passage intimating that the supreme Lord according as His desire is to raise or throw down a human soul, makes him do good or bad actions, confirms the view taken by the son of Vallabhacarya. Another passages[3] from the Veda in which the perfectly innocent child-like sage declaring that he was not the author of evil, it was not in his power to do the

2. Vidvanmandanam, p. 164.
3. Rgveda, VII, 86.6.

wrong, but it was either the destiny, or wine, or anger, or gambling or unconsciousness, whatever it might be, the supreme Lord who was near him was more responsible for his wrong doing, because it was He who guided him in that direction, teaches the same thing. Hence it is that a Brahmana[1] daily prays to Lord Savitr to guide his thoughts. 'The soul of all and the internal ruler of men' lends support to this same view. Lord Krsna[2] teaches the same thing when He declares to Arjuna that happiness, misery, bhava, bhava, fear, fearlessness, ahimsa, sense of equality, satisfaction, penance, charity, glory, censure all these of human souls are due to Him; The Lord through His power moves all being sitting in their heart, deprives a human soul of the independence of his activity, and teaches the supreme government of the Divine Will in the order of the universe. The author of Vedanta-sutras also declares that the whole universe is merely a sport on the part of the Lord Supreme. In the creation of the universe the Supreme **brahman** has not other motive except the **lila**-sport. All these quotations go to confirm the view of Vithalanatha Diksita. They all declare that all this is the eternal sport of the Supreme **nirguna brahman**. This being a mere self-

1. Savitur varenyuam bhargo...dhiyo...nah pracodayat.
2. Gita, X. 4-5.

willed sport of the divine **nirguna brahman**[3] makes efforts itself and makes a human soul-**jiva** do similar efforts and then gives him his deserved fruits. Thus **nirguna brahman** manifests itself free from all short-comings.Thus Vyasa, Vallabha, and Vitthala solve the same problem in the best way, the latter going a step further in elucidating the point. Technically the first solution is called **adhi-bhautika**, second **adhyatmika** while the third **adhidaivika.** All of them ultimately come to this conclusion that it is the divine Will that is at the bottom of all activity. The human soul has to consciously or unconsciously play the part assigned to him by the Lord and after playing which to return to the abode of eternal bliss from where he has come. This whole universe with all its diversities, opinions and activities is the grand eternal Drama composed by the Greatest Artist; and higher the devotion of human soul rises the better he understands the divine element working through every nook

3. Vithalanatha explains 'krta-prayatnapeksah' of the B.S. II. 3.42, as prayatna 'kriya-purva-kulinatma-dharma' of brahman itself, which suggests itself for the preceding sutra-word 'Parat' referring to brahman. Vallabhacarya takes it as 'jiva-krta-prayatnapeksah.' Both ultimately refer to Divine Will

'Ayam api paksah svakrta-maryadayah eva hetutvena kathanat, maryada-karane ca krideccham rte hetvantrarasyasambhavad asmaduktan natiricyate... kriya-purvakatinatma-dharmasyaiva prayaina-sabdarthatvena vaktum ucitatvat na dharmadharmau tad vacyau. Kinca, tvadukta-prakare 'vidhi-nisedhavaiyarthyadibhyah' ityeva syat, na tu vihita-ityaditi dik. (Vidvan-mandanam. p. 165). This remark of Gosvami Vithalanatha deserves to be weightily considered.

and corner of the universe. The immense diversity and unequality vanishes away from his sight, in the immense diversity he sees the perfect harmony. He ceases to attribute his independent activity to be the cause of pleasure or pain. The distribution of happiness and misery is done by supreme **nirguna brahman** according to its divine will for the eternal sport. Thus understanding the human soul becomes free from his narrow ideas of pleasure and pain. His vision becomes deep and enlightened. Getting an insight into the greatness and goodness of the Lord and realising his own littleness, he becomes charmed of the Divine Fair, forgets his individuality and consequently his sorrow and misery and then in full joy sings the glory of the Great God.

The **svarupa** of **brahman** as conceived by Vallabhacarya has been described. Unlike Sankara, he accepts **brahman** to be the abode of all attributes, even contradictory ones, **brahman** is all-doer, the first and final cause of all and the primary enjoyer of all, **brahman** is free from any faults which may appear to accrue to it, through its all-pervading activities-sarva-kartrtva. It must have been noticed how the faults of partiality and cruelty are set aside by Vyasa, Vallabhacharya and his son. Vyasa gives **karma-sapeksatva** or **jiva-krta-prayatnapeksatva** individual's **karma** or effort as the reason why **brahman is nirdosa-innocent, Vallabhacarya** gives **atma-srsti** and his son,

divine sport-**lila** to set aside the same objection. Thus it will be clear that there is no valid reason against the view that **brahman nirguna** alone-without nescience is all doer. Well does Vallabha say in his Subodhini[1], 'fault-**dusana** or object of fault-**dusya**-whatever is is **brahman Hari**-Himself, all these contradictions fully adorn here only'. All the three believe that **brahman** is pure, free from **maya**-and its nature is such as possesses even contradictory attributes, thereby they all unite in singing the eternal glory of the Divine Fair.

SVARUPAS OF BRAHMAN : The conception of **brahman** in general has been set forth in the foregoing pages, we now proceed to deal with the varying conceptions under which **brahman** is described by different sages to whom it revealed itself. The numerous and varying attributes and forms, with which **brahman** is described by different sages, do not lead us to believe that in each case the sage describes not the same **brahman**. It is to the highest glory of Indian genius that in the immense diversity of numerous conceptions it can perceive a way by which not only the conflict is avoided, but a whole and harmonious conception of **brahman** answering to all the different descriptions is met with. Thus where a European scholar stands bewildered, the devout Indian sees not only no conflict, but finds a satisfactory way, in which all the diverse

1. yat kincid dusanam caira dusyam capi Harih svayam. viruddha-paksah sarve'pi sarvam atraiva sobhate.

passages describe one and the same **brahman**. Nay the Indian philosophers believe that all the Upanisads teach one and the same **brahman**, the difference in description varies with the degree of the individual sage's revelation. Again among Indian philosophers the method of harmonising the diverse conceptions of **brahman** varies very considerably. Sankara divides the texts of the Upanisads into two classes one referring to the Higher **brahman** and the other to the Lower One. Where Vedic passages present a negative conception, it is supposed to refer to Higher **brahman**, while passages describing **brahman** as possessed of positive attributes are supposed to describe the Lower One. The conception of a personal God like **Isvara**, creator, etc., refers to the Lower **brahman**, which owes its existence to the **sad-asat-sadasad-anirvacaniyamaya** - the indescribable illusion. With the removal of **maya** the Lower **brahman** drops into a non-entity, and, it then ceases to exist. With **Isvara** ceases also the conflict of the negative conception with the positive conception. To Sankara, as he is under the spell of Buddhism, the completely negative conception appeals the most. By subordinating the affirmative **Srutis** to negative ones, he works out the so-called **ekavakyata**-unanimity of the conflicting Vedic passages. The merits or drawbacks whatever of this method have been suggested before. Ramanjua and Madhva do not find a satisfactory way to get out of this to

difficulty. They studiously reject the two **brahmans** and not unfrequently twist the wording of the holy texts. With them the pure **advaita** of the Upanisads results in **dvaita**. In this point Sankara seems to have decided advantages over these two philosophers. But the only great drawback in his case is that his is an imaginary distinction. It is not supported by the authority of the learned Vyasa. In order to show that it is countenanced by the sutras of Vyasa attention is drawn to sutras like 2.1.13, where by the use of the word **'Lokavat'**, it is urgerd, Vyasa directly hints at the vyavahara and paramartha stages, and through them to two **brahmans**. But this is far from convincing. The truth is that when the case is quite clear, Vyasa simply says **'lokavat'**, 'as in the world.' The case is so apparent that Vyasa does not see it necessary to point at any particular examples, like **pata, ksira, ahikundala,** etc. Again the word **'lokavat'** is used to illustrate what Vyasa wants to propund in that particular sutra, and it is only the sectarian zeal that sees in it a shadow of support to the so-called theory of **vyavahara** and **paramartha** stages. The right way of looking at **brahman** is to banish, from one`s mind, the ideas of rationation independent of Vedic texts, and to accept **brahman** as it is described in the Upanisads. Rightly says Sankara that this sastra is not based on reasoning as such. It is a pity that Sankara in his zeal for **mayavada** forgets his own true words. The right way to understand **brahman is,**

see it as Vyasa does in B.S. 2.1.27[1] and 3.2.27.[2] In these sutras Vyasa teaches the **viruddha-dharamasrayatva of brahman**. He accepts **brahman** to be unchangeable and impartite and still the material cause of the universe on the authority of the Vedic texts, that is, **brahman** is possessed of even contradictory attributes. The same principle when applied to the Vedic passages solves the difficulty without the least twist. Vedic passages whether negative like 'It is not so' or affirmative like 'The omniscient, the almighty' describe the same **brahman**. The conception of **brahman** varies with the individual revelation of each sage. Thus sages[1] describe the different aspects-**svarupas** of the one and the same **brahman**. To evince its supreme glory and greatness, the highest **brahman** becomes revealed even in contradiction. The **brahman** becomes manifest as simple and complex, one and infinite. Though it cannot be compared with anything in the world, still one cannot say that **brahman** is not that thing. Unequal to anything in the world, it is equal to a gnat or an elephant. Brahman being everything even contradiction is **brahman**. The narrow standard of the undeveloped reason wanting in divine perception is not to be resorted to in its case. With this end in view Vyasa plans the first chapter of his **portion or cit-**

1. srutestu sabdamulatvat. (B.S.II. 1.27).
2. ubhaya-vyapadesat ivahi kundalvat. (B.S. III. 2.27).
1. ekam sad vipra bahudha vadanti (Rgveda).

Brahmamimamsa and teaches that **jyotih**, **prana**, **vaisvanara** and like words are names of **brahman**. Their primary significance is that of the supreme deity, but by **sakti-sankoca**-limitation of the power to express the full sense, viz., **brahman**,-they have ceased to signify the highest divinity in the world at large, and now these words are understood to signify a variety of objects. To put it clearly, the words like **jyotih, prana, vayu,** though they are used in the world as the names of the elements of nature, signify in **brahma-mimamsa**, the highest divinity. Thus it is that by showing each and every word to mean the supreme **brahman**, Vyasa clearly sets forth the highest truth taught in the famous sentence of the Chandogya, 'verily all this is brahman'. By showing the **sarva-rupatva** of **brahman** is the first pada, its **adheyatva** in the second, **adharatva** in the third and finally discarding the Vedic claims of **prakrti** of the Sankhya in the fourth, Vyasa works out his samanvaya-un-animity of all Vedic passages in signifying the highest principle **brahman**. Hence words like **antaryamin, prana, jyotih, vaisvanara, bhuman, aksara, akasa, avyakta, suksma dahara, prasasaka, setu, vidharana, apahata-papman,** though meaning something else elsewhere, express the highest divinity **brahman** in **brahma-mimamsa**. As **brahman** is **saccidananda**-these varying conceptions are classified according as **sat-portion** or **cit-portion** or **ananda-portion** is prominent. The conception in which **sat-**

portion or **ananda-portion** is prominent is technically known as **adhi-bhautika** or **adhyatmika** or **adhi-daivika** respectively, **jagat**, in which **sat-portion** is prominent, is the **adhi-bhautika svarupa** of **brahman, aksara**, in which **cit-portion** is prominent, is the **adhyatmika svarupa** of **brahman**, and **purusottama** in which **ananda-portion** is prominent, is the **adhi-daivika svarupa** of **brahman**. Hence in this part only the different **svarupas** of the same **brahman** are mentioned. These **svarupas** are non-separable and non-dual from the Supreme **nirguna brahman**. A brief account of these **svarupas** will be suitable to close the section on **brahman**.

Jagat-universe-which we see around us is the **adhi-bhautika svarupa** of **brahman**. In it the **sat-portion** of **brahman** is manifest while the **cit-portion** and the **ananda-portion** are non-manifest. Hence **jagat** is non-dual from **brahman**. The non-duality[1] of the cause **brahman** and effect **jagat** is taught by Vyasa in 2.1.14. The universe and **brahman** are non-dual on account of words like **arambhana** etc. The **ananyatva** does not mean the unreality of the universe, Non-duality is a relation, and so it cannot exist between Sankara`s existing **brahman** and non-existing universe. The universe is a form of **brahman**[2]. Brahman developed itself into the universe form for its all-

1. tad ananyatvam arambhana-sabdadibhyah. (B.S. II. 1.14).
2. tadevaitat prakarena bhavatiti sruter matam. (Siddhanata.muktavati. 5).

eternal sport, without itself undergoing the least change. It should[3] not be urged that there would be a confusion between enjoyer and enjoyed on account of the non-duality, for we see in the world that though both are non-dual developments of gold, the **kataka** does neither become **kundala** nor **kundala kataka**. The variety of effects, though the cause is the same, is too apparent in the world. The reader's attention will be drawn to this subject further on when we come to describe the **avikrta-parinama-vada.**

Aksara is the **adhyatmika svarupa of brahman. Aksara** is that form of **brahman** having resorted to which the Supreme Lord became **purusa** and prakrti[4]. All the negative **Srutis** describe this **aksara.** Non-dual as is **aksara** from **purusottama**, in it the **ananda-portion** is measured-**ganitananda**, while **purusottama** is bliss unlimited. By the will of the supreme **brahman**, some **ananda-portion** becomes[1] non-manifest, as it were, when this **svarupa** is known as **aksara**. Basing the **sutra** on the **ananda-mimamsa** Vyasa teaches this. **Aksara is brahman** itself. It is far above the human soul. It is greater than **prakrti** and **purusa** for both of them develop out of it. It is

3. bhokirupatter avibhagascet syallakavat. (B.S. II. 1.13).
4. Prakrtih purusascobhau paramatma bhavat pura. yadrupam sam adhisthaya tad aksaram udiryate. (T.D.N. II. 98).
1. iyad a mananat. (B.S. III. 3.34). See also T.D.N. II. 99-104. The perusal of Vallabhacarya's own commentary and Avaranabhanga of Purusottamaji on this portion will be interesting to those who want to enter into further details on this point.

pervading[2], all-light, **cit-pradhana**. It is **niranjana, nirakara, nirvisesa** etc. Infinite are the forms of **nirguna brahman**, but it is the aksra **svarupa** that a **jnanin** tries to reach. When a jnanin worship **brahman** internally, this **aksara** becomes manifest in his heart as **antaryamin** and he achieves what is known as **sadyomukti**-emancipation without any perambulation and enters pada of **brahman**. The emancipation of **Sisupala** is to be explained in the same light. It should not be supposed that the **jnanin does** not reach **brahman for aksara** is also a form of **paramatman**. Just as a river mingles with an ocean losing name form and becomes. **tad-rupa** (ocean) so the **jnanin** loses name and form and becomes **aksara-rupa**. This is the highest fruit that the **suddhadvaitin** jnanin achieves.

To a **bhakta**, however, the **aksara svarupa** becomes manifest as an abode, **'vyapi vaikuntha'** of **purusottama** in which the **purusottama** has his abode. It is **dahara** in which **sadananda** becomes manifest to the **aksara-bhakta**. The words like **vyoman, akasa** in the Vedas, and **dhaman** in the Gita are the various forms under which **aksara** is mentioned as the abode of **purusottama**. In the **Brahmananda-valli, aksara brahman** is described as the tail **(puccha)** of **anandamaya purusottama**. The **anandamaya** is described as **hamsa** and **aksara brahman**

2. vyapaka-rupa advaita-brahma je tejomaya kahevaya. aryapantha adhikari muni-jana te mamhe laya thaya. (Vallabhakhyana).

as its tail, rightly so, because the **hamsas** and like birds sit on their tails. Sankara's interpretation of this passage in conjunction with the **ananda-mayadhi-karana** is an example of the horrible twist that that commentator often gives to the sacred writings.

Purusottama is **adhi-daivika svarupa of brahman**. This is **ananda-rupa**. It is the Highest Divinity. It is beyond **aksara** which serves as his abode, when the loving devotees like maids of Gokula or Narada experience the highest bliss. He is greater than **ksara** and **aksara** and so known as **purusottama** in the loka and the Veda[1]. **Aksara** is his **dhaman**[2]. These three **svarupas of brahman** are beautifully illustrated by Vallabhacarya in his Siddhanta-muktavali on the analogy of the Ganga[3]. The waters of the river correspond to **jagat**, **sakti** to **aksara** and the **deity** to **Krsna**, another name for **purusottama**. The great poet and bhakta Dayarama[4] also compares **purusottama** with the moon and **aksara** with the moon-light. This means that the highest divinity-**purusottama**-who is to be attained through loving devotion alone, becomes 'He-that is-a personal God-who can be approached by the humblest through pure love.

1. Gita.XV. 18. Manilal's blind zeal for mayavada does not even hesitate to twist this clear meaning of the verse.
2. Gita. VIII. 21.
3. Siddhanta-muktavati. 9.
4. tamara to Hari sarve re, amara to Hari eka ja sthâle. tamo rijho camdanithi re, amo rijhie candrathi re. (Dayaramabhai).

The grace of the supreme Lord is so great that for the sake of the loving devotee he does not become manifest before him as all-pervading, but as **atmarati**, **atmakrida**, **atmamithuna**, **atmananda**. He is **rasa-ananda-bliss** attained through self-sacrificing love alone. He is beyond maya[5], **prakrti**, time, space, in fact everything that is earthly.

5. 'na yatra maya kimutapare' etc. (Bha.). 'na yatra kalo nimisam parah prabhuh.' (Bha. II. 2.17).

36

37

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8/16, M. K. Amin Marg, Patel Building.
Fort, Mumbai - 400 001, India.
Tel. : 91-22-2267 8185, 2267 2734
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